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NOTES
DO AS WE SAY OR DO AS WE DO?: HOW THE
SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK CONTROVERSY

REVEALS A LACK OF ACCOUNTABILITY AT THE
HIGH COURT
I. INTRODUCTION

For the latter part of the last century, Americans enjoyed the
protection of numerous federal laws against employment discrimination.
This protection began as a spartan set of laws and, over time, has
developed into a significant body of law affording employees protection
against nearly all recognizable forms of discrimination. At present, there
are eleven primary federal labor laws safeguarding the American
employee's right to be free of discrimination in obtaining employment,
during employment, and in termination of employment. Arguably, the
cornerstone of this legislation is Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964
("Title VIP' or "Act").'
Until 1995, these laws did not apply to any employees of the three
branches of the United States government. The Legislature was immune
from the law it enacted; 2 the Executive Office was free from the
provisions of the law it enforced;3 yet, the Judiciary remains partially
exempt from the laws it serves to interpret. This unique privilege of the
Supreme Court will be explored in detail herein.
This Note will begin by briefly examining the development of Title
VII and its associated provisions. Next, the extension of this law to the

1. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241,256-66 (1964) (codified at 42
U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17).
2. This was true prior to the enactment of the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995,
Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (1994 and Supp. H 1996)).
See infra Section II.A (discussing the Congressional Accountability Act).
3. Likewise, this was the state of affairs until the Presidential and Executive Office Act was
enacted. See Presidential and Executive Office Act, 3 U.S.C. §§ 401-471 (1994 and Supp. II1996).
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legislative and executive branches will be studied. The focus of this
Note, a call for the application of Title VII to the judicial branch, will
follow. Specifically, we will scrutinize the United States Supreme Court
Justices' hiring practices of law clerks against the backdrop of Title VII.
A discussion about the current attempts to extend Title VII to the Court
will follow. The most prominent movement in this area has been House
Resolution 1048, 4 submitted in the 106th Congress. However, as written,
this bill is an insufficient remedy. Finally, the Note will conclude with
suggestions as to how this controversial problem may be rectified while
keeping within the bounds of the Constitution, the terms and intent of
Title VII, and fundamental notions of justice and equality.
This Note is not meant and should not be taken as an endorsement
of affirmative action. Nor should it be viewed as a critique of the same.
Simply put, this Note has nothing to do with affirmative action.
The purpose of this Note is to demonstrate how a loophole in Title
VII allows federal jurists, Supreme Court Justices in particular, to avoid
specific laws that the other two branches of the federal government, as
well as the entire private sector, must follow. Proponents of affirmative
action can appreciate this effort to illustrate the importance of injecting
minority input and perspective into a small group comprised mostly of
young, white male lawyers who occupy a highly influential position in
our government. Opponents of affirmitive action may also appreciate
bringing the Justices within the purview of Title VII, since it just may
provide them with a new perspective when they create and review case
law on the topic. In other words, perhaps forcing the Justices to live by
the same laws they interpret for the rest of us will provide them with a
better understanding of the burdens placed on private employers by the
Act. In any event, the authors view this Note as a bi-partisan statement
regarding governmental accountability, and nothing more.
II. TITLE VII AND SUBSEQUENT LEGISLATION

Employees first obtained a private cause of action against
employers for employment-based discrimination when Congress passed
Title VII. The Act is designed to ensure equal employment opportunities
by prohibiting those employment practices which discriminate on the
basis of "race, color, religion, sex, or national origin."5 Specifically, its
goal is to "remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an
4. H.R. Res. 1048, 106th Cong. (1999).
5. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1).
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identifiable group of white employees over other employees."6 Title VII
prohibits not only those employment practices that overtly discriminate,
but also those which tend to have a discriminatory effect.7 To this end,
even those practices which are not intended to promulgate any form of
discrimination may, nonetheless, be prohibited if they "operate

invidiously to discriminate. '

Regrettably, Title VII was not without its shortcomings.9
Originally, the Act did not extend coverage to any federal, state, or local
government employees.'0 In 1972, Congress took its first step toward
making governmental employers accountable for employment
discrimination by enacting the Equal Employment Opportunity Act
("EEOA")." The EEOA amended Title VII and expanded the Act's

coverage to give certain federal employees the same protections against
employment discrimination as private-sector employees. 2 "A principal
goal of the amending legislation.., was to eradicate 'entrenched
discrimination in the Federal Service.""' 3 Despite the fact that federal

employment discrimination was already prohibited by law, 4 Congress
enacted the EEOA due to mounting criticism of the Civil Service
Commission's complaint procedure, 5 and the general inability of federal
6. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,429-30 (1971).
7. See id.at 431. The Griggs Court also held that employment practices which are "neutral
on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if they operate to 'freeze' the
status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices." Id.at 430.
8. Id.at431.
9. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 3 (1971) ("Despite the commitment of Congress to the goal
of equal employment opportunity for all our citizens, the machinery created by the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 is not adequate."). The House Report stated that even though there had been moderate
improvements made in minority hiring since 1964, "minority groups are not obtaining their rightful
at 4.
place in our society." Id.
10. See Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840, 841 (1976); see also Brown v. Gen. Servs.
Admin., 425 U.S. 820, 825 (1976) (observing that before 1972, Title VII did not extend to federal
employees).
11. See Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103 (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-e17 (1994)).
12. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a). This section provides in part:
All personnel actions affecting employees or applicants for employment.., in executive
agencies as defined in section 105 of title 5 ...and in those units of the legislative and
judicial branches of the Federal Government having positions in the competitive
service... shall be made free from any discrimination based on race, color, religion, sex,
or national origin.
Id.
13. Chandler, 425 U.S. at 841 (quoting Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535,547 (1974)).
14. See Brown, 425 U.S. at 825. The Court noted that "federal employment discrimination
clearly violated both the Constitution and statutory law ....Id.(citations omitted).
15. Before the 1972 amendments to Title VII, discrimination charges "were handled
parochially within each federal agency." Id. Even if outside examiners were brought in to conduct
independent examinations, their findings were merely "recommendations that the agency was free
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employees to access the courts and obtain judicial relief.16 Consequently,
a procedure was established for federal employees to bring employment
discrimination claims. 7 The authority to hear and investigate such
claims is vested in the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
("EEOC" or "Commission").' 8 Previously, the EEOC's main function
under Title VII was conciliatory in nature. 9 The EEOA:
[R]emedie[d] the failure to include effective enforcement powers in
Title VII by... empower[ing] the Commission, after it has exhausted
the procedures for achieving voluntary compliance, to issue complaints
and hold hearings, to issue cease and desist orders against
discriminatory practices, and to seek enforcement of its orders in
Federal CourtsY0
In section 2000e-16(c), the EEOA gave aggrieved federal
employees the opportunity to report discriminatory action and to file
private suits in federal district court after exhausting administrative
remedies.2 ' This marked the first time that the federal government
to accept or reject." Id. Employees could then choose to report their complaint to the Civil Service
Commission. See id. However, "Congress found 'skepticism' among federal employees 'regarding
the Commission's record in obtaining just resolutions of complaints and adequate remedies. This
has, in turn, discouraged persons from filing complaints.., for fear [of]... antagonizing their
supervisors and impairing any future hope of advancement."' Id. at 825-26 (quoting H.R. REP. No.
92-238, at 24).
16. See id at 828 ("The legislative history... leaves little doubt.., that federal employees
who were treated discriminatorily had no effective judicial remedy... [a]nd the case law [is in
accordance with] that conclusion."); see also H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 14.
17. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(c); see also 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(f)-(g) (authorizing federal
courts to issue injunctive relief and to order such action as is necessary to remedy the effects of
unlawful employment-based discrimination).
18. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b). It reads in relevant part:
[The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission shall have authority to enforce the
provisions of subsection (a) of this section through appropriate remedies, including
reinstatement or hiring of employees with or without backpay, as will effectuate the
policies of this section, and shall issue such rules, regulations, orders and instructions as
it deems necessary and appropriate to carry out its responsibilities under this section.
Id. Section 16(b) also empowers the EEOC to issue annual reviews and approvals of national and
regional equal employment opportunity plans for each federal agency covered by the Act, to review
and evaluate the operation of such programs, and to solicit recommendations of outside
organizations relating to equal employment opportunity. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b)(l)-(3).
19. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 9 (noting that the EEOC was able to achieve successful
conciliation in less than half the cases before it, the Report found that "respondents have more often
than not shrugged off the Commission's entreaties and relied upon the unlikelihood of the parties
suing them").
20. Id.
21. See, e.g., Gen. Tel. Co. of the Northwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 446 U.S. 318, 324 (1980). In
holding that the Commission's authority to bring suit is not dependent upon Rule 23 of the Federal
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waived its sovereign immunity with regard to employment
discrimination claims.22 The EEOA also demonstrated that "Congress
clearly intended to give public employees the same substantive rights
and remedies that had previously been provided for employees in the
,
private sector ....
When Congress amended Title VII in the EEOA, it intended to
rectify the "emphasis on voluntariness ...[which had] proven to be
most detrimental to the successful operation of Title VII. ' 24 When Title
VII was originally passed:
It was thought that a scheme which stressed conciliation rather than
compulsory processes would be more appropriate for the resolution of
this essentially "human" problem. Litigation, it was thought, would be
necessary only on an occasional basis in the event of determined
recalcitrance. Experience, however, has shown this to be an
oversimplified expectation, incorrect in its conclusions.,
Congressional skepticism of "voluntary" and "parochial" methods of
eliminating employment discrimination led to the EEOA's passage in
1972.6 Congress clearly espoused the view that any system of selfgovernance in the area of employment discrimination was unacceptable,
since it did nothing to remedy the "systems and effects" that generally
characterized the problem.27 Consequently, Congress authorized the
EEOC to enforce its findings in federal court. To this end, the Act served
to create a level of accountability that did not previously exist for both
private and public sector employers alike. 28

Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court stated "the EEOC need look no further than § 706 [of Title VI]
for its authority to bring suit in its own name for the purpose... of securing relief for a group of
aggrieved individuals." Id.
22. See Brown, 425 U.S. at 827 ('In many cases, the [aggrieved] employee must overcome a
The Brown case also quotes a statement
U.S. Government defense of sovereign immunity... "').
made during the EEOA's floor debate by Senator Cranston, co-author of the EEOA: "'[f]or the first
time, [the bill would] permit Federal employees to sue the Federal Government in discrimination
cases."' Id. at 828.
23. Douglas v. Hampton, 512 F.2d 976,981 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
24. H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 9.
25. Id. at 8.
26. See id. at 8-9; see also Brown, 425 U.S. at 825 (noting that a hearing examiner "had no
authority to conduct an independent examination, and his conclusions and findings were in the
nature of recommendations that [a government agency] was free to accept or reject") (citation
omitted).
27. See H.R. REP. No. 92-238, at 8.
28. See id. at 5.
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A. The CongressionalAccountability Act of 1995

"[Congress] can make no law which will not have its full operation
on themselves and their friends, as well as on the great mass of society.

This has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which
human policy can connect the rulers and the people together." 9

Although James Madison penned these words over two hundred years
ago,3" Congress seemingly did not appreciate this fundamental notion

until recently. In 1995, Congress that recognized it should not enjoy
immunity from the laws it enacts and subsequently passed the
Congressional Accountability Act ("CAA").3 Under the CAA, eleven
workplace laws were made applicable to Congress.32
The CAA, the first law passed by the 104th Congress in January

1995, was seen as a major triumph in the Republican's newly introduced
Contract with America.33 The CAA ended a one-hundred year

Congressional custom of enacting laws which created rights against both
private and public employers, while simultaneously excluding their
application towards Congress.3 A movement to end this practice began
in the early 1970s with the issuance of a Report by the Joint Committee

on Congressional Operations regarding the constitutional immunity of
congressional

members.35 The

movement

continued to produce

substantial discourse, but no significant action was taken.36
29. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, at 291 (James Madison) (Buccaneer Books ed., 1992).
30. See id.
31. Pub. L. No. 104-1, 109 Stat. 3 (1995) (codified at 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438 (1994 and Supp.
II 1996)).
32. See 2 U.S.C. § 1302. The eleven laws are: The Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938, Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, the Family Medical and Leave Act of 1993, the
Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970, Chapter 71 (law pertaining to federal service labormanagement relations) of Title 5, Employee Polygraph Protection Act of 1988, Worker Adjustment
and Retraining Notification Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Chapter 43 (pertaining to veterans'
employment and re-employment) of Title 38. See id.
33. See James J. Brudney, Congressional Accountability and Denial: Speech or Debate
Clause and Conflict of Interest Challengesto Unionizationof CongressionalEmployees, 36 HARV.
J. ON LEGIS. 1, 1 (1999).
On the first day of the 104th Congress, the new Republican majority will immediately
pass the following major reforms, aimed at restoring the faith and trust of the American
people in their government: First, require all laws that apply to the rest of the country
also apply equally to the Congress.
NEWT GINGRICH ET AL., CONTRACT WITH AMERICA 8 (Ed Gillespie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994)
(emphasis in original).
34. See Brudney, supra note 33, at 5.
35. See S. Rep. No. 93-896, at 38-39,53 (2d Sess. 1974).
36. See, e.g., 137 CONG. REC. S15,384 (daily ed. Oct. 29, 1991) (Sen. John Seymour (R-Cal.)
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1. Legislative History of the "CAA"
Despite the fact that the problems the CAA sought to redress were
identified many years earlier, the CAA itself has relatively little
legislative history37 and "was the fastest that a new Congress [had] sent
legislation to the White House since March 1933.",3 Even though there
is little legislative history, the Act traveled a long road in Congress.
Senator Charles Grassley (R-Iowa), the chief proponent of the CAA,
first sought to bind Congress under the same laws it applies to
businesses through the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990
("ADA"), but found little success.40
The following year, Senator Grassley sought congressional
inclusion under the Civil Rights Act of 1990.41 On the Senate floor,
Grassley posed the following question to his peers: "[i]f civil rights bills
are alleged to be crucial in the fight against discrimination, why is
Congress not joining in that fight other than in the capacity of saying it
is good for everyone else, but it is not good for us? 42 This inquiry
yielded a fate similar to Grassley's previous attempt.43
Grassley's next opportunity to apply anti-discrimination law to
Congress arose during the debates on the Family and Medical Leave
Act.' However, after being assured consideration during the upcoming
Civil Rights Act of 1991 debate, he withdrew his proposition.45 Senator
Grassley's efforts to gain support for his amendment were well-timed
because of the check bouncing scandal in the House of Representatives
and the on-going Clarence Thomas/Anita Hill hearings.4 6 The public
gradually began to realize that if Hill had been a Congressional
(stating that excluding Congress from the application of civil rights laws is "a cancer of
unaccountability"); 136 CONG. REc. S9369 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
(questioning the morality of the Senate acting as if it is above the law); 125 CONG. REc. 10,591
(daily ed. May 10, 1979) (Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) (referring to Congress as "the last plantation").
37. See James T. O'Reilly, Collision in the Congress: Congressional Accountability,
Workplace Conflict, and the Separationof Powers, 5 GEO. MASON L. REv. 1, 1 (1996).
38. Kenneth J. Cooper, House Sends CongressionalCompliance Bill to Clinton, WASH. POST,
Jan. 18, 1995, at A4 (citing comments made by Rep. Newt Gingrich (R-Ga.)).
39. See Sen. Charles Grassley with Jennifer Shaw Schmidt, Practicing What We Preach: A
Legislative History of CongressionalAccountability, 35 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 33,36 (1998).
40. See id. at 37-38 (explaining the problems that Sen. Grassley encountered).
41. See id.
42. 136 CONG. REC. S9361 (daily ed. July 10, 1990) (statement of Sen. Grassley).
43. See Grassley, supranote 39, at 38 (observing that his amendment was tabled by a vote of

63-26).
44. See id.
45. See id.
46. See id. at 38-39.
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employee, she would not have been afforded the same legal remedies as
a private sector employee.47 Thus, the belief that Congress was capable
of meaningful self-regulation was cast into doubt.4" Through
compromise, and with the support of various interest groups,49

newspapers,-5 and President George Bush,5 Senator Grassley eventually
witnessed the application of laws, such as the Civil Rights Act of 1964
and the ADA to Congress.52

Following this accomplishment, Congress, in 1992, formed the
Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress to address the issue of
the legislative branch's compliance with federal laws. 3 This Senate
Committee deferred to the Report of the Senate Task Force on
Congressional Coverage, whose recommendations were "weaker than
current Senate rules[,]" according to Senator Grassley 4 Subsequently,

on May 4, 1994, Senator Joseph Lieberman (D-Conn.) and a number of
other co-sponsors introduced the CAA to the Senate.5 In the interim, the
House passed similar legislation by a vote of 427-4 .56
The diligent and persistent efforts of the proponents of the CAA
kept the legislation "in the public eye, especially by making it an
election issue. 5 7 This ensured its priority in the following term.58 The
bill, absent hearings and committee votes, was adopted on January 4,
1995 by a 429-0 vote. 9 In turn, the Senate passed the bill by a 98-1
vote. 60 On January 23, 1995, President Clinton signed the bill into law.6'
47. See id. at 39.
48. See Grassley, supra note 39, at 39.
49. See id. at 38 (recognizing that supporting groups included the National Federation of
Independent Businesses, the National Taxpayers Union, the U.S. Business and Industrial Council,
and the Citizens for Congressional Reform).
50. See Editorial, Congress's Wild Ganders,WALL ST. J., Oct. 10, 1991, at A14, available at
1991 WL-WSJ 588990; Editorial, Congress Must End Its Above-the-Law Privileges,USA TODAY,
Oct. 10, 1991, at 12A.
51. See Bush Reflects on Congress,WALL ST. J., Oct. 28, 1991, at A16. The President pushed
Congress to "submit to the laws it imposes on others.., and do so by year's end." Id. In addition,
he cautioned that the branch's practices "create[d] the appearance and reality of a privileged class of
rulers who stand above the law." Id.
52. See Grassley, supranote 39, at 39-40.
53. See id. at 41; see also H.R. Con. Res. 192, 102d Cong. (1991) (establishing the
Committee).
54. Grassley, supranote 39, at 42.
55. See id. at 43; see also S.2071, 103d Cong. (1994) (enacted).
56. See H.R. REP.No. 103-841, at 2 (1994) (enacted).
57. Grassley, supra note 39, at 44.
58. See id.
59. See 141 CONG. REc. H104 (daily ed. Jan. 4, 1995) (noting that the vote occurred on Jan.
4, 1995, but was published on Jan. 5, 1995).
60. See 141 CONG. REc. S767 (daily ed. Jan. 11, 1995).
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B. Presidentialand Executive Office Act 2
After extending coverage of federal labor laws to Congress, the
next logical step to ensure that the federal government lives by the same
laws as private employers, was to extend their application to the two
remaining branches. Towards that end, the eleven anti-discrimination
labor laws incorporated into the CAA were extended to cover "(A) each
office, agency, or other component of the Executive Office of the
President; (B) the Executive Residence at the White House; and (C) the
official residence (temporary or otherwise) of the Vice President."63 At
this point, the extension of these laws to the judicial branch seemed all
but inevitable.
C. Where is the JudicialAccountability Act?
If Congress abides by the laws it enacts, and the Executive by the
laws it enforces, then should it not follow that the United States Supreme
Court act in accordance with, and under the purview of, the laws it
interprets?64 Despite the clarity and common sense of this proposition,
the Judicial Conference, a committee acting as the decision-making body
and mouthpiece for the federal courts on this issue, has strongly resisted
the extension of these laws to the Judiciary. 65
A provision of the CAA required the Judicial Conference to draft a
report which included recommendations it "[had] for legislation...
provid[ing]... employees of the judicial branch the rights, protections,
and procedures under [labor and employment] laws, including
administrative and judicial relief' 66 consistent with those protections
afforded to congressional employees through the CAA. However, the
Conference's Report ("Report" or "Judicial Conference Report")
resisted such legislation to preserve the Judiciary's autonomous role in

61. See O'Reilly, supra note 37, at 3.
62. 3 U.S.C. §§ 401-471.
63. Id. §§ 401(a)(4)(A)-(C).
64. See Ronald D. Rotunda, Resurrecting Federalism Under The New Tenth and Fourteenth
Amendments, 29 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 953, 965 (1998) ("[A]s a general policy, if we all lived under
the same laws, particularly the judges, they would have a better sense of how to interpret them.").
65.

See REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES (Dec. 1996)

[hereinafter JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY] ("[Tihe Judicial Conference conclude[d] that
legislation is neither necessary nor advisable in order to provide judicial branch employees with
protections comparable to those provided to legislative branch employees under the CAA.").
66. 2 U.S.C. § 1434.
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the federal government.67 Leonidas Ralph Mecham, director of the
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, added in defense of
the Report that "Congress usually has chosen not to micro-manage or
unnecessarily bureaucratize the day-to-day management of the courts,
instead leaving court management to the judges."O
Is this to suggest that if judges are bound by federal legislation
aimed at preventing bias and discrimination in employment, the
consequences will be a runaway bureaucracy hampering the effective
administration of justice? If so, then this is at odds with the position
taken by the Judicial Conference just one year earlier in its "Long Range
Plan for the Federal Courts"6 9 issued in 1995. The Report stated that
"bias, in all of its forms, presents a danger to the effective administration
of justice in federal courts."70
In response to the Judicial Conference's rejection of the suggestion
that the Judiciary come under the same umbrella of federal labor laws as
the other two branches and the private sector, Senator Grassley stated:
"If followed, these recommendations would make the Judiciary the only
remaining branch of the federal government that is not required to live
with this country's labor laws."7 Grassley added that "this indicates that
the Judiciary believes that its work is more important than the work of
any other American business or branch of government. ' 72
Chief Judge Julia Gibbons of the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Tennessee disagrees with Grassley and insists that
"[t]he judicial branch is committed to providing the general protections
of the CAA laws in a manner that preserves judicial independence and
the decentralized administration of the federal courts."" Senator
Grassley responded by noting that "[i]f the Judiciary is truly interested in
providing the protections of these labor laws... it will not object to
legislation that creates an independent office that implements and

67. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY, supra note 65, at 20 ("The judiciary's approach to the
CAA reflects two complementary goals: a commitment to providing judicial branch employees with
the protection of the CAA laws, coupled with the fundamental need to preserve judicial
independence and the decentralized administration of the federal courts."); see also Bruce D.
Brown, JudiciarySays No to Workplace Rules, LEGAL TIMES, Jan. 6, 1997, at 10.
68. Brown, supra note 67, at 10.
69. REP. OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES; LONG RANGE PLAN FOR THE FED. CTS.
(Dec. 1995).
70. Id. at 113 (quoting REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE UNITED
STATES, at64 (Sept. 1992)).
71. Grassley, supranote 39, at49.
72. Id.
73. Brown, supra note 67, at 10.
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74
enforces the actual laws that apply to the rest of the country."

II. THE SITUATION TODAY

A. The CurrentLaw
Over twenty years ago, the Judicial Conference passed a resolution
requiring federal courts to adopt and implement affirmative action
plans.7 5 The result was the Model Equal Employment Opportunity Plan76
("Model Plan7'), which articulated the Conference's policy of "providing
equal employment to all persons regardless of their race, sex, color,
national origin, religion, age ...or handicap." 77 It required each court to
"promote equal employment opportunity through a program
encompassing all facets of personnel management including recruitment,
hiring, promotion, and advancement." 78 In the Model Plan, law clerks are
included within the scope of its coverage, as the Plan extends to "all
court personnel including judges' staffs and court officers and their
staffs. 79
Under the Model Plan, complainants must first file a written
complaint stating the facts giving rise to their claim, as well as the relief
they are requesting." The claim must then be filed with the court's Equal
Employment Opportunity ("EEO") Coordinator within fifteen days of
the alleged incident.8' Significantly, the EEO coordinator and the chief
judge are given complete discretion to determine if and how to proceed,
resolve, and remedy a complaint." Since the provisions of the complaint
procedure do not speak to the available remedies, presumably the EEO
coordinator and chief judge,, have total discretion as to the appropriate

74. Id.

75. See Lynn K. Rhinehart, Note, Is There Gender Bias in the Judicial Law Clerk Selection
Process?,83 GEO. L.J. 575, 598 (1994).

76. See id.
77. Id. (quoting REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUD.

CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES; JUD.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM-MODEL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
PLAN B-5 (1980, revised 1986)).

78. Id. (quoting REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUD. CONF. OF THE UNITED STATES; JUD.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM-MODEL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY

PLAN B-5 (1980, revised 1986)).
79. Id. (quoting REP. OF THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE JUD. CONF.OF THE UNITED STATES; JUD.
EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY PROGRAM-MODEL EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
PLAN B-5 (1980, revised 1986)) (emphasis added).

80. See Rhinehart, supra note 75, at 598-99.
81. See id.
82. See id. at 599.
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remedy. 3
Compared to the length of time afforded to employees under Title
VII to file a complaint," the Model Plan's fifteen-day deadline seems
excessively short. Considering the reservations one may have about
filing a complaint against a federal judge, the fifteen-day statute of
limitations is only one example of the inadequacy of the present internal
complaint system.5
Employees of the Judiciary seeking relief in employment
discrimination matters must rely solely upon this mechanism. There is
no access to the federal courts via Title VII or other anti-discriminatory
federal legislation.86 However, when employees possess the option, and
opportunity, to sue under federal labor laws in federal court, internal
complaint mechanisms are desirable from an employee's standpoint.
"'To the extent that internal grievance procedures work it is because you
have the option of suing in federal court ....If you don't have that,
there is no accountability.'"7
B. The CurrentControversy
In 1882, Justice Horace Gray became the first Supreme Court
Justice to hire a law clerk.88 Justice Gray was also known to refer to his
clerks as "his boys."8 9 Perhaps this represents the true starting point of a
controversy which has only began to take shape recently. In March
1998, USA Today published the first demographic account of clerks
hired by United States Supreme Court Justices throughout their
respective terms.' ° The results showed that of the 394 clerks hired by the
current Justices, merely 1.8% were African-American, 1% were
Hispanic, 4.5% were Asian, 24.3% were women, and no Native

83. See id.
84. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (stating that the length of time to file a complaint is 180 days).
85. See Rhinehart, supra note 75, at 599.
86. See Brown, supra note 67, at 12 (discussing a plaintiffs attorney's opinion that "the
inability of judicial employees to bring cases in federal court under Title VII... diminishes the
effectiveness of the system").
87. Id. (quoting Lynne Bernabei, a partner at Bernabei & Katz in Washington, D.C.).
88. See Mark R. Brown, Gender Discrimination in the Supreme Court's Clerkship Selection
Process, 75 OR. L. REv. 359, 361 n.12 (1996).
89. John Bilyeu Oakley & Robert S. Thompson, Law Clerks in Judges' Eyes: Tradition and
Innovation in the Use of Legal Staff by American Judges, 67 CAL. L. REV. 1286, 1290 n.13 (1979)
(citations omitted).
90. See Tony Mauro, Justices Give Pivotal Role to Novice Lawyers, USA TODAY, Mar. 13,
1998, at IA [hereinafter Mauro, Justices].
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American had ever been hired as a Supreme Court clerk.91 According to
a USA Today article, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, and Justices
Scalia, Kennedy, and Souter have never hired an African-American
clerk. The article further revealed that Justice Scalia had the poorest
record of minority-hiring among Justices, having never hired a minority

law clerk."
The subsequent series of articles appearing in USA Today
describing the Court's hiring practices unleashed a wave of national
controversy. 94 However, undaunted by mounting criticism, the Justices
did little to change their hiring practices during the next term.9" Civil
rights groups and leaders, bar associations, and members of Congress
have since urged the Justices to meet with them to discuss hiring
policies, but to no avail.96 Most of these efforts have focused on the
Chief Justice,
but he has opted to forego a meeting with any of these
97
groups.

In October 1998, Representative Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-ll1.)
introduced House Resolution 591, a measure designed to "[e]xpress[ ]
the sense of the House of Representatives that the Supreme Court of the
91. See id. at 1A; Lawrence R. Baca, If It's the First Money [sic] in October Indians are
Gathering on the Supreme Court Steps (Oct. 4, 1999), at http://www.jessejacksonjr.org (on file with
the Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal).
92. See Tony Mauro, Corps of Clerks Lacking in Diversity, USA TODAY, Mar. 13, 1998, at
12A, available at 1998 WL 5718669 [hereinafter Mauro, Corps].
93. See id.
94. See Clarence Page, Defining Merit at the Supreme Court, CHI. TRiB., Dec. 9, 1998, at 25,
available at 1998 WL 23513823 ("When reporter Tony Mauro of USA Today reported those
numbers last summer, the civil rights community erupted in protests, resulting in the arrest of
NAACP President Kweisi Mfume and 18 others on the Court's front steps ....).
95. See id. ("For the second year in a row, the high court has no black clerks. Although
minorities constitute 20 percent of law school graduates, less than 2 percent of the 428 clerks hired
by current justices during their respective tenures were black."); see also Tony Mauro, High Court
Hires More Minorities, USA TODAY, Sept. 9, 1999, at 1A, available at 1999 WL 6852936
[hereinafter Mauro, High Court] (stating that during the 1998-99 term, the Court scaled back on
minority hiring, as only one was hired this term).
96. See generally Linn Washington, Jr., Bringing More Blacks to Clerking, 13 NAT'L BAR
ASS'N MAG. 34 (Jan/Feb. 1999) ('[In the wake of... criticism triggered by the USA Today piece
and subsequent calls for the Court to engage in dialogue with minority bar groups, [Chief Justice]
Rehnquist wrote... to three black Congress members that it would be 'inappropriate for any justice
..to seek guidance from special constituencies."'); see also Editorial, Supreme Court Offers Lame
Excuse for Lack of Diversity, USA TODAY, Dec. 9, 1998, at 14A [hereinafter Editorial, Supreme
Court] ("Was that a brush-off or a kiss-off that Chief Justice William Rehnquist delivered to
members of Congress who had complained about the lack of diversity among Supreme Court
clerks?").
97. See Mauro, High Court, supra note 95, at 1A.The Chief Justice felt that a meeting with
the National Bar Association, the most prominent African-American bar group, to discuss the lack
of minority clerks hired by the Court would not "serve any useful purpose." Id.
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United States should improve its employment practices with regard to
hiring more qualified minority applicants to serve as clerks to the
Justices."9 8 The proposed resolution placed emphasis on the Court's
"shameful record"" of hiring minority and women clerks, and referenced
the latest study."0 Further, the resolution recommended that the Supreme
Court implement a recruiting procedure to ensure diversity among law

clerks.'0 ' Proponents of the resolution in Congress have promised to
"raise this issue as a matter of national concern until [they] can see that
the numbers have changed.

' °2

However, the Court has maintained that

clerk selection is merely a reflection of the available "pool" of top law
school graduates, rather than of the personal preferences of the
individual Justice." 3 The next section explores this "pool" of graduates,
the arguments surrounding its use, and the role of law clerks in the
modern Supreme Court.
1. The "Old-Boy Network" and the Modem Clerk
There are two arguments proffered by the Supreme Court with
respect to its hiring practices. The first places blame for a poor hiring
record on the non-diversified labor pool that produces most Supreme

Court law clerks (dubbed the "old-boy network" by critics),t 4 The
second argument contemplates some of the constitutional implications
surrounding the use of corrective legislation."
Currently, the system of clerk selection favors the upper-echelon of
law schools."' It has been reported that forty percent of the clerks are
from only Harvard and Yale. ' 7 Moreover, a system exists by which
98. H.R. Res. 591, 105th Cong., at IV (1998).
99. Id. at 2.
100. See id. The study, performed after Mauro's March 1998 article, found that of the 428 law
clerks hired by the current Justices, "(1) only 1.6 percent were African-American; (2) only 1.2
percent were Hispanic-American; (3) 4.2 percent were Asian-American; (4) none were NativeAmerican; and (5) only 25.2 percent were women[.]" Id.
101. See id. at 2-3.
102. Tony Mauro, Rehnquist: DiversityA Grad PoolFunction, USA TODAY, Dec. 8, 1998, at
4A [hereinafter Mauro, Rehnquist] (statement by Rep. Danny Davis (D-Ill.)).
103. See id. ("In explaining the low number of minorities hired as Supreme Court law clerks,
Chief Justice William Rehnquist blamed the 'pool' of top law school graduates the court [sic] draws
from.").
104. See Trenton H. Norris, The Judicial Clerkship Selection Process: An Applicant's
Perspectiveon BadApples, Sour Grapes,and FruitfulReform, 81 CAL. L. REV. 765, 774 (1993).
105. See discussion infra Section llI.B.2.
106. See Mauro, Corps,supranote 92, at 12A.
107. See Mauro, Rehnquist, supra note 102, at 4A. Further, the vast majority of students come
from one of five schools: Harvard, Yale, Columbia, Stanford, and the University of Chicago. See
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clerks are "fed" from lower federal court judges to Supreme Court
Justices.'*' "Supreme Court clerks tend to have held clerkships with one
of a dozen or so federal appellate judges known as the High Court's
'feeder' judges."' 9 Some Justices are quick to pass blame onto the
"feeders" for the lack of diversity existing among the Supreme Court
clerks," and point a finger at law schools themselves for providing the
limited pool from which to select qualified minority and women
candidates."' Apparently though, this has not stopped the Justices from
recruiting from these schools, which, in many cases, happen to be their
alma maters."2 Supreme Court Justices are also known 3to favor specific

geographic regions when making their hiring decisions."

Critics of the system maintain that, cumulatively, the sources from

which Justices recruit clerks create a "perpetual color line" that is not
easily dismantled."4 Others believe that the type of discrimination
occurring in the Justices' chambers is "institutional" and that the hiring
system only perpetuates its existence."' Currently, minorities make up
approximately 20% of law school students, and women make up
approximately 49.4% of the Fall 2000 first year class." 6 Critics suggest
that these statistics reflect the true "labor pool" from which Justices may
hire, and that the number of clerks should generally coincide with
Mauro, Corps, supranote 92, at 12A.
108. See Laura Gatland, A Clerkship for White Males Only?, 28 STUDENT LAW. 34, 36-37
(Oct. 1999).
109. Id. at 36. Some of the more conspicuous "feeders" include Judge Laurence Silberman
(D.C. Cir.), Chief Judge Richard Posner (7th Cir.), and Judge Patricia Wald (D.C. Cir.). See id.
110. See Tony Mauro, Thomas Said to be Frustratedby Lack of Minority Clerks, USA TODAY,
Aug. 5, 1998, at IA. Justice Thomas indicated to Randy Jones, President of the National Bar
Association, that he placed most of the responsibility for the low number of minority Supreme
Court clerks with the federal appeals court judges who 'feed' their law clerks to the high court. See
id.
I1l. See Editorial, Supreme Court,supra note 96, at 14A ("[Chief Justice] Rehnquist... says
that as the demographics change, so will the number of minorities selected for clerkships. In other
words, a lack of diversity in the labor pool defends a lack of diversity in employment.").
112. See Norris, supranote 104, at774.
113. See id. at 774-75 (providing a list of Justices with the law schools and geographic regions
they predominantly hired from).
114. See Editorial, Supreme Court,supra note 96, at 14A.
115. The term "institutional" refers to an employment practice which is deeply embedded
within the construct of a particular institution. See Jane Byeff Korn, Institutional Sexism:
Responsibilityand Intent, 4 TEX.J. WOMEN & L. 83, 101-02 (1995) (explaining that discrimination
can be perceived as an institutional phenomena, but such a perception is "a convenient aid to the
denial process"). "It puts the burden on the institution and turns attention away from the individuals
who make up the institution." Id. at 102.
116. See Editorial, Supreme Court, supranote 96, at 14A (for statistics pertaining to minorities
in 1997); Jonathan D. Glater, Women Are Close to Being Majority of Law Students, N.Y. TIMES,
Mar. 26, 2001, at Al (citing statistics pertaining to women).
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them.'1 7 Some critics have observed that if Justices O'Connor and

Ginsburg are capable of finding qualified women to clerk for them,
despite under-representation in the "elite" law schools, then other
Justices should have no problem finding qualified minorities."8 The

Supreme Court's justifications might not suffice if it were subject to the
federal anti-employment discrimination laws. Indeed, there is a
possibility that if the Supreme Court were a private employer, it may be
subject to a "disparate impact" discrimination claim."9

In response to mounting criticism of their employment practices,
some Justices have tried to publicly downplay the importance and

impact of their clerks. Justice Stevens explained in late 1997 that "[t]he
[J]ustices work very hard... [t]he idea that the clerks do all the work is
nutty.' 20 In accordance with this sentiment, Justice Scalia called the
proposition "laughable.' ' 12' However, even Justice Stevens admits that
clerks have assumed a much greater role in today's Supreme Court
jurisprudence. 22 It is ironic that Justice Scalia would choose the word
"laughable," as he once noted that "[e]ach one of those clerks knows the
particular case four times better than I do."' Moreover, Justice Scalia
was the first Justice in Supreme Court history to admit complete reliance

on a law clerk when drafting an opinion."
While Supreme Court Justices undoubtedly control and direct the
"design" of their opinions, clerks are often the ones who first put ink to

117. See Editorial, Supreme Court, supra note 96, at 14A ("[B]ecause of the nature of the
[hiring] network, it overwhelmingly favors whites, which this year constitute 97% of the Supreme
Court's clerks, although minorities constitute almost 20% of 1997's law grads.").
118. See Gatland, supra note 108, at 36. Mark Brown, a law professor at Stetson University
College of Law, explained, "I look at [Justices Ginsburg and O'Connor], who are pretty much
models [for hiring female clerks]. If they can hire women, what about the other ones? USA Today
found that 40 percent of Ginsburg's and 43 percent of O'Connor's clerks were women." Id.
119. See discussion infra Section IV.B.2.
120. Mauro, Justices,supranote 90, at IA.
121. Justice Antonin Scalia, Address at Hofstra University School of Law (Oct. 12, 1998).
Justice Scalia was heard to make this comment in response to a question posed by a student during a
speech delivered to entering first year law students. Both authors were in attendance.
122. See Mauro, Justices, supra note 90, at IA. Justice Stevens acknowledged this when he
stated that "I had a lot less responsibility [as a Supreme Court law clerk] than some of the clerks
now. They are much more involved in the entire process now." Id.
123. See Norris, supranote 104, at 770-71 (footnote omitted).
124. See Jim Chen, The Mystery and the Mastery of the JudicialPower, 59 Mo. L. REV. 281,
291-92 (1994). In Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511 (1993), Justice Scalia wrote a concurrence in
which he "[c]onfess[ed] that [he] ha[d] not personally investigated" excerpts he had quoted from the
legislative history of a federal statute. Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 527 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). Instead, the Justice relied on "a hapless law clerk to whom [he] assigned to the task."
Id.
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paper.'5 In some cases, Justices have been known to grant free reign to
their clerks on first drafts.1 26 This is no small detail, as lower courts

nationwide scrutinize every word of a Supreme Court opinion."
However, the most impressive and important power of the clerks
lies in their ability to determine which cases come before the High
Court. The advent of the "cert pool," a device by which a single law

clerk reviews and summarizes incoming petitions for a pool of Justices
and recommends whether certiorari should be granted, 2s endows clerks
with an "awesome responsibility."'29 Some commentators believe that
the "cert pool" is the primary culprit behind a prejudice in favor of noncommercial cases, since commercial cases may seem less exciting to
clerks.' Former Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr, once a clerk to
Chief Justice Burger, has noted that "[s]electing 100 or so cases from the

pool of 6,000 petitions is just too important to invest in very smart but
brand-new lawyers.'' Other renowned judges have noted that "[t]he
difference between having clerks that are merely good and ones that are
awesome
can be the difference between a bad year and a wonderful
132
one."
Whether the power of clerks in today's Supreme Court is
substantial, fictional, or merely exaggerated, there is at least a strong

perception of power that pervades. 33 In 1998, Congressman Meeks (DN.Y.) (on behalf of himself, Congressman Conyers (D-Ill.), and
Congressman Jackson) submitted House Resolution 591 to the United
States House of Representatives.' 4 The resolution focused solely on the

125. Mauro, Justices, supranote 90, at IA.
126. See id. Even though Justices Breyer, Souter, Scalia and Stevens are reportedly more
involved with the actual writing of first drafts, "[Chief Justice] Rehnquist and [Justices] O'Connor,
Kennedy, Ruth Bader Ginsburg and Clarence Thomas are said to give their clerks free reign with
first drafts fairly often." Id.
127. See id. Michael Dorf, a law professor at Columbia University and former clerk for Justice
Kennedy, explained that "[iln the broad sweep of the law, the effect of clerks is negligible, but it is
true that, sometimes, you will see lower courts deciding a case [based] on their interpretation of a
phrase written by a clerk." Id.
128. See id. (describing how this began in 1972, when the Court was faced with a growing
caseload).
129. See id. (noting that some clerks "describe screening last-minute death row appeals as the
most awesome responsibility they have").
130. See Mauro, Justices,supra note 90, at IA.
131. Id.
132. Norris, supra note 104, at 766 n.4 (quoting Alex Kozinski, Confessions of a Bad Apple,
100 YALE L.J. 1707, 1708 (1991)).
133. See, e.g., Mauro, Justices, supranote 90, at 1A ("They are the most powerful, least known
young lawyers in America. They are the law clerks of the Supreme Court.").
134. H.R. Res. 591,105th Cong. (1998).
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budding controversy surrounding the Justices' hiring practices.' s Crafted
mainly to express the House's sense of dissatisfaction with the Court's
record of minority and female hiring among clerks, the resolution called
on the Justices to improve their employment practices. 3 6 In support of its
argument, the resolution cited the most recent statistical data.'37 It also
cataloged different issues arising before the Court which minorities have
a vested interest in, such as: workplace discrimination, death penalty
appeals, police brutality, and affirmative action. ' Despite its status as a
mere "resolution," House Resolution 591 was nonetheless
groundbreaking in that it was the first direct criticism, by any branch of
government, of the Supreme Court's hiring practices.'39 There would be
more significant criticism to follow.
2. The Constitutionalityof CorrectiveLegislation
As previously stated, the Congressional Accountability Act
includes a provision whereby the Judicial Conference of the United
States was directed to prepare and submit a report to Congress
concerning the applicability of federal labor laws to the federal
Judiciary. '4° Although the purpose of this provision was to permit the
Judiciary to determine how it could best be covered, the Report instead
recommended that the Judiciary remain outside the scope of the federal
labor laws.' 4' Citing the "fundamental need to preserve judicial
independence and the decentralized administration of the federal
courts[,]', 42 the Report concluded that best way to adhere to the
principles and
spirit of the labor laws, and the CAA, was through self4
regulation. 1
135. See id.
136. See id. It was resolved that: "(1) the United States Supreme Court should move in an
expeditious manner to improve its employment practices with regard to hiring more qualified
minority applicants to serve as clerks; and (2) the United States Supreme Court should implement
recruiting procedures to ensure that diversity is emphasized and not undermined." Id.
137. See id.

138. See id.
139. Although the CAA contemplated a method by which the country's labor and employment
laws could be applied to the judicial branch, there was no direct admonishment of the current

Court's employment practices. See 2 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1438.
140. See 2 U.S.C. § 1434.
141. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY, supra note 65. In response to the Conference's
recommendations, Senator Grassley remarked: "Not surprisingly, I am skeptical of the study's
findings." See Grassley, supranote 39, at 49.
142. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY, supra note 65, at 20.

143. See id. at 15 ("The primary goals of the [J]udiciary in addressing potential changes to
current policies are to retain enforcement within the judicial branch structures that have been
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However, upon examination of the Supreme Court's own words, it
does not appear that an encroachment upon "judicial independence" will
occur if the courts fall under a legislatively-devised regulatory scheme.' 445
Moreover, the Report's concern over "separation of powers" problems'
obscures the true issue: judicial immunity and its limits.
The Judicial Conference's Report claims that the application of the
federal labor laws to the Judiciary would be more than just an
imposition. It concludes that the independent judicial decision-making
function of Article II courts would be severely impaired if the very laws
which judges interpret apply to themselves as employers. 46 To this end,
the Report states that "[a]lthough independence in administrative matters
cannot be absolute, the judicial branch must have control over its
employee and workplace management in order to ensure both the
independence, and the appearance of independence, of its decisions.' 47
Furthermore, the Judicial Conference notes that "[j]udicial
autonomy in hiring law clerks and other judicial staff... are the types of
administrative and managerial tasks that contribute in a significant way
to the preservation of an independent judiciary.' 4 8 Unfortunately, the
report does not explain how. Presumably, this has something to do with
a Supreme Court case which illustrated the difference between the
judicial and administrative functions of judges.
In Forresterv. White, 49 the Supreme Court broached the issue of
absolute judicial immunity to civil suits. 50 In this case, a federal judge
was being sued for employment discrimination. 5 ' The Court explained
the significance of judicial immunity by noting that "[i]f judges were
personally liable for erroneous decisions, the resulting avalanche of
suits, most of them frivolous but vexatious, would provide powerful
created to maintain self-governance, to avoid unnecessary bureaucracy, and to remain sensitive to
the legitimate needs of the individual judges and courts.").
144. See id. at 20.
145. See id. at 15.
146. See id. at 3-4 ("The judicial branch is a separate and co-equal branch of government under
the United States Constitution. It must retain autonomy with respect to internal administration,
including the ability to address the personnel, workplace safety, and accessibility issues raised in the
CAA laws.").
147. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY, supra note 65, at 4.
148. Id. at 4.
149. 484 U.S. 219 (1988).
150. See id. at 219. The case centered around a former probation officer (Forrester) who
alleged that she was demoted and dismissed by her employer (Judge Howard Lee White, of the
Seventh Judicial Circuit of Illinois and presiding Judge of the Circuit Court of Jersey County in
Illinois) because of her sex, in violation of her civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and the Equal
Protection Clause of the 14th Amendment. See id. at 221-22.
151. See id.

Published by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law, 2001

19

Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal, Vol. 18, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 10
Hofstra Labor & Employment Law Journal

[Vol. 18:625

incentives for judges to avoid rendering decisions likely to provoke such
suits.' 5 2 However, the Court held that judges were not absolutely
immune from civil suits filed against them, and "limited absolute
judicial immunity to those acts which are truly judicial acts and are not
simply administrative acts."'53 Forrester reaches this conclusion by
utilizing the "functional" approach to immunity questions, whereby the
Court examines the "nature of the functions with which [a judge] has
been lawfully entrusted," and whether those functions are adversely
affected by "exposure to particular forms of liability ... ."'4 The Court
also determined "that Judge White was acting in an administrative
capacity when he demoted and discharged [Probation Officer]
Forrester."' 5
The implications of this are considerable, because it means that "[a]
judge is not taking a judicial act when he fires his personnel. He is
acting as an employer who is also a judge."'156 Presumably, a judge is
acting as an employer when he hires personnel.'57 This case made it clear
that absolute immunity, which "is justified and defined by the functions
it protects and serves, not by the person to whom it attaches[,]"' 58 was
not to provide protection for judges who make employment decisions
concerning their own staff. Clearly, these types of decisions are not
judicial in nature or function, and judges should not be shielded from
private suits when they operate invidiously to discriminate."'
Accordingly, it would seem as though the employee, through the EEOC,
should also have the ability to file employment discrimination suits for
these same acts of discrimination against judges who operate in violation
of Title VII.
The Judicial Conference's Report also argues that the hiring of law
152. Id. at 226-27.
153. Morrison v. Lipscomb, 877 F.2d 463, 465 (1989) (emphasis added) (explaining the
holding in Forrester).
154. Forrester,484 U.S. at 224.
155. Id. at 229.
156. Morrison, 877 F.2d at 465 (emphasis added).
157. See Forrester,484 U.S. at 228. "Difficulties have arisen primarily in attempting to draw
the line between truly judicial acts, for which judicial immunity is appropriate, and acts that simply
happen to have been done by judges." Id. at 227.
158. Id. at 227 (emphasis in original).
159. See New Alaska Dev. Corp. v. Guetschow, 869 F.2d 1298, 1302 (9th Cir.1989). The court
identified several factors to determine if an act is judicial in nature:
(1) the precise act is a normal judicial function; (2) the events occurred in the judge's
chambers; (3) the controversy centered around a case then pending before the judge; and
(4) the events at issue arose directly and immediately out of a confrontation with the
judge in his or her official capacity.
Id. at 1302.
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clerks is especially important in preserving judicial autonomy. 60 Perhaps
this is due to the significant role law clerks serve, and the import of the
administrative functions they perform, in today's Supreme Court

jurisprudence. Yet, Forresterexpressly recognized that limitations on
judicial immunity must be imposed, even where a particular
administrative function is an integral part of our legal system. 6'
Therefore, it is difficult to argue that a clerk's position is so utterly
crucial to the system that their hiring is actually a "judicial process."' 62

Finally, the Report gives brief mention to "separation of powers
concerns" and possible corrective legislation.63 Specifically, the Report
maintains that the legislative branch, in forming the Office of
Compliance, elected to retain enforcement authority due to such
concerns, and that the judicial branch "needs internal enforcement for
the same reasons."' 64 Despite the fact that none of these concerns were
actually listed in the Report, the argument is significant nonetheless.

That is because if corrective legislation were ever to be passed through
Congress, the Supreme Court might formulate a separation of powers
argument as its rationale for striking the law down. However, it has been
noted that "the separation of powers does not require 'three airtight
departments of government."" 65 The Supreme Court has explained that
the "legitimate needs" of one branch of government can and should

160. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY, supra note 65, at 4.
161. See Forrester,484 U.S. at 229.
"[Judge White's] acts-like many others involved in supervising court employees and
overseeing the efficient operation of a court-may have been quite important in
providing the necessary conditions of a sound adjudicative system. The decisions at
issue, however, were not themselves judicial or adjudicative.... [A] judge who hires or
fires a probation officer cannot meaningfully be distinguished from a district attorney
who hires and fires assistant district attorneys, or indeed from any other Executive
Branch official who is responsible for making such employment decisions. Such
decisions, like personnel decisions made by judges, are often crucial to tire efficient
operation of public institutions.., yet no one suggests that they give rise to absolute
iniunity from liability in damages under § 1983."
Id. (emphasis added).
162. See generally Meek v. County of Riverside, 183 F.3d 962 (9th Cir. 1999) (holding that the
firing of a court commissioner was an administrative decision). In this case, it was claimed that a
court commissioner (unlike Forrester) played an "inherent role" in the judicial process, and that the
decision to fire a commissioner was "inherently judicial." See id. at 966. The Ninth Circuit rejected
this analysis, noting that the appellants could "point to no case in which a court evaluated the nature
of the services provided by a fired employee to determine whether the decision to terminate was
judicial." Id.
163. JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY, supranote 65, at 15.
164. Id. at 15.
165. United States v. Estrada, 680 F. Supp. 1312, 1319 (D. Minn. 1988) (quoting Nixon v.
Admin. Gen. Servs., 433 U.S. 425,443 (1977)).
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occasionally outweigh the competing interests of another "[i]n a manner
that preserves the essential functions of each branch."' Indeed, judges'

"judicial functions" cannot be impaired unless they are acting within
their official capacities as judges,'67 and the Forrester Court made it

clear that employment-based decisions are not judicial in nature.
Therefore, the "essential functions" of Article III courts are not disturbed
by judges' administrative decisions, and the "essential functions" of the
Judiciary are clearly preserved if, and when, Congress chooses to pass
legislation pertaining to those administrative decisions.

Congress has not retained complete enforcement authority over
employment discrimination claims by legislative staffers. While,
indisputably, the centerpiece of the CAA is the Office of Compliance,'6

staffers still maintain the option of bringing an action in federal court."'
This ensures a certain measure of accountability within the Office of

Compliance. However, judicial branch employees are not afforded a
similar option. 7 ' The procedures prescribed by the Judicial Conference

for handling employment discrimination claims do not provide for an
alternative venue for judicial staffers. At no point does a claim actually
leave the judiciary for adjudication elsewhere. Instead, final appellate
authority lies with the presiding judge in each particular district,' so
these judges are essentially judging their peers.

166. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 707 (1974). Further, "'[wihile the Constitution
diffuses power the better to secure liberty, it also contemplates that practice will integrate the
dispersed powers into a workable government. It enjoins upon its branches separateness but
interdependence, autonomy but reciprocity."' Id. (quoting Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v.
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579,635 (1952)).
167. See, e.g., Er parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339, 348 (1880), Here, the Court upheld an
indictment against ajudge for unlawfully discriminating on the basis of race in selecting trial jurors,
See id. 348-49.
168. See Grassley, supra note 39, at 46.
169. See id. at 46-47. After conciliatory efforts to resolve a complaint have failed, the CAA
allows congressional employees to either request an administrative proceeding, or bring a civil
action. See id. at 47 ("The administrative proceeding involves the filing of a formal complaint with
the Office of Compliance, an administrative hearing, and review by the Office of Compliance's
Board of Directors."). Further, and more importantly, the decision made in the administrative
proceeding can be appealed to the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See id.
170. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY, supra note 65, at 6. Under the current system, an
employee or job applicant initiates a complaint by filing it with the court's designated EEO
Coordinator. See id. The Coordinator then investigates the complaint, and seeks an informal
resolution. If such a resolution is not possible, the Coordinator then "prepares a report describing
findings and recommendations, explaining how the complaint was resolved, and stating any
corrective actions to be taken." Id. If the complainant'is not satisfied with the EEO Coordinator's
resolution, he or she can request a review by the chief judge of the particular court. The chief judge
may hold a hearing on the matter, and issue a final decree. See id.
171. See id.
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The Judicial Conference purports to be concerned with the "conflict
of interest or appearance of a conflict of interest" that would arise if
labor laws were applied to the Judiciary.' Inexplicably though, the
Judicial Conference does not seem concerned with potential conflicts of
interest that may arise when judges, who work together, judge each
other. Further, the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court heads the Judicial
Conference and appoints all members of Judicial Conference
Committees. 3 Therein lies part of the problem-the current Chief
Justice's hiring record of minority and women law clerks is suspect, to
say the least. 74
If the Judiciary sincerely wishes to adhere to the spirit of the labor
laws, then following the rules laid down by corrective legislation should
not be problematic. Moreover, if the Judicial Conference guidelines truly
provide comparable protection for employees, as claimed,' 5 then
applying the country's labor laws to the judicial branch should be no
great imposition.
IV. THE FIGHT TODAY
A. The JudicialBranch Employment Non-DiscriminationAct of 1999 '6
The Justices of the United States Supreme Court hired thirty-four
law clerks to assist them in adjudicating the cases on the Court's docket
for the 1999-2000 term.'" Of these clerks, two were African-American
and three were of Asian decent. Remarkably, this constitutes the greatest
number of minority law clerks hired in recent times by the Court. 78 In
response to the increase in these numbers, Randy Jones, former
President of the National Bar Association, stated: "It's clear that our
effort has had a positive effect on the hearts of [sic] minds of the
[J]ustices ....But we are far from done on this issue."'79 Hillary

172. See id. at 3.
173. See id. at 25 (Appendix A).
174. See Mauro, Corps, supra note 92, at 12A (noting that ninety-nine percent of the Chief
Justice's clerks have been white, and that eighty-six percent of those clerks have been male).
175. See JUDICIAL CONFERENCE STUDY, supra note 65, at 2 ("[T]he Judicial Conference
concludes that legislation is neither necessary nor advisable in order to provide judicial branch
employees with protections comparable to those provided to legislative branch employees under the

CAA.").
176.
177.
178.
179.

H.R. Res. 1048, 106th Cong. (1999).
See Mauro, High Court,supranote 95, at IA.
See id.
Id.
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Shelton, the NAACP's Washington lobbyist agreed, "[tihere's forward
movement, but we're not satisfied, by any means[.] ''5 Similarly,
Representative Jackson was less then pleased with the overall number of
minority applicants hired by the Supreme Court.
The over-all picture of equal opportunity at the Supreme Court is still
woefully out of focus. We cannot trust the voluntary "good faith
efforts" of a 'states' rights' Chief Justice who entertains other lawyers
by singing Dixie. We don't want a more perfect states' rights Supreme
Court. We want a Supreme Court that will interpret the law in such a
way as to give us "a more perfect Union." We must institutionalize in
the law the obligation of the Supreme Court to provide equal
opportunity and non-discrimination for all Americans. 8'
These comments were delivered on the floor of the House of
Representatives on October 4, 1999, the same day the Supreme Court
commenced its 1999-2000 term.182 Jackson, as previously stated, played
a role in bringing the controversial hiring practices of Supreme Court
clerks to the attention of 105th Congress in 1998 via House Resolution
591. On March 10, 1999, the Congressman, with the support of forty
fellow representatives, introduced House Resolution 1048 to the 106th
Congress, which was referred to the House Judiciary Committee.'83 He
stated:
My legislation requires that the Supreme Court and the entire Judicial
Branch of the federal government comply with the laws they currently
interpret for others. With my legislation the Supreme Court can no
longer merely say, "Do as I say." They will have to legally comply
with, "Do as I do."' 4
This bill seeks to write the final chapter and close the book on this
subject, by extending the federal non-discrimination laws to the judicial
branch.' s While it is true that the Justices of the Supreme Court have no
180. Id.
181. Rep. Jesse Jackson, Jr., Equal Justice Under the Law: Address at the Opening of the 19992000 Supreme Court Session (Oct. 4, 1999), at http://www.jessejacksonjr.org [hereinafter Equal
Justice Under the Law] (on file with the Hofstra Labor and Employment Law Journal).
182. See id.
183. H.R. Res. 1048, 106th Cong. (1999).
184. Equal Justice Under the Law, supranote 181 (emphasis added).
185. H.R. Res. 1048, 106th Cong. (1999).
The entire Executive Branch of government is subject to Title VII of the 1964 Civil
Rights Act. When the Republicans became the majority in the House and the Senate in
1994, they brought the Legislative Branch under Title VII. Only the Judicial Branch of
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initial say in whether remedial legislation is enacted to address their
hiring of law clerks, they do not appear to believe that their hiring
practices are a cause for concern.
B. Title VII
1. EEOC Action or Private Action
Any action brought by an aggrieved employee under Title VII must
commence solely by filing a charge, under oath, with the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.'86 After the charge has been
filed, the EEOC must notify the respondent within ten days and then
conduct an investigation into the complaint, which will result in a
determination as to whether or not the charge is true.'87 Should the
investigation indicate the charge lacks reasonable cause, the EEOC must
dismiss it and notify the complainant, who may then bring a private
action within ninety days.'
If the EEOC investigation indicates there is reasonable cause, it
must seek to eliminate the wrongful practice "by informal methods of
conference, conciliation, and persuasion."'8 9 In those cases where that
method is an ineffective remedy to the alleged illegal employment
practice, the EEOC may then commence an action against the
respondent in the appropriate federal district court.
If the EEOC fails to file suit within 180 days from the date the
charge was filed, the charging party may request permission to sue
individually. The party then has ninety days to begin an action.''

the federal government remains outside the law-and that is wrong. That is unfair. The
Supreme Court should not remain above and outside the law.
Equal Justice Under The Law, supranote 181.
186. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
187. See id.
188. See id. § 2000e-5(f)(1); see also McDonell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 798
(1973) (holding that an EEOC finding that reasonable cause does not exist is no bar to a private
lawsuit).
189. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b); see also Marjorie A. Silver, The Uses and Abuses of Informal
Procedures in Federal Civil Rights Enforcement, 55 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 504 (1987)
(discussing the EEOC's complaint processing procedures).
190. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(O(3).
191. See42U.S.C.§ 2000e-5(f)(1).
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2. Disparate Impact Under Title VII & Equal Protection Under the
Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments
Disparate impact discrimination, which falls under Title VII,

prohibits employment practices that clearly favor one protected group
over another, regardless of any intention to discriminate.'9 2 The Supreme
Court first recognized this doctrine in 1971 in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co.'93 and has since expanded and clarified the doctrine through a
number of subsequent decisions.'" To establish a prima facie case of

disparate impact discrimination, the plaintiff must: (1) identify the
specific employment practices or selection criteria being challenged; (2)
show disparate impact; and (3)
prove causation. '
The
defendant/respondent has the opportunity to justify the challenged
employment practice by offering proof discrediting the plaintiff's

statistics or introducing their own statistics showing that no disparity
exists.'96 The employer may also present evidence that the challenged

practice is part of a legitimate business necessity and it is job related.97
Thereafter, the plaintiff has the opportunity to cast doubt on these
explanations.' 8
Congress, concerned that the Supreme Court was misinterpreting
the statute regarding the defendant's burden, amended Title VII through
the Civil Rights Act of 1991, and, in so doing, overruled the Supreme
Court's decision in Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio.'9, The
amendment provides:
An unlawful employment practice based on disparate impact is
established under this [Title] only if192. See Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,430-33 (1971).
193. Id. at 430-33.
194. See Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 487 U.S. 977 (1988); Connecticut v. Teal, 457
U.S. 440 (1982); Castaneda v. Partida, 430 U.S. 482 (1977); Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
195. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 994-97.
196. See id. at 996-97.
197. See id. at 997-1000; Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. The burden the defendant bears, with respect
to showing business necessity, has been subject to alteration by the Supreme Court since 1971.
However, this judicial modification has been resolved by Congress through the Civil Rights Act of
1991. See infra note 200 and accompanying text.
198. See Watson, 487 U.S. at 998,
199. 490 U.S. 642 (1989). See Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071,
1071 (1991) (Section III states that "[tlhe purposes of this Act are... to codify the concepts of
'business necessity' and 'job related' enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs v. Duke Power
Co., and in other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio[,]")
(citations omitted).
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(i) a complaining party demonstrates that a respondent uses a particular
employment practice that causes a disparate impact on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin and the respondent fails to
demonstrate that the challenged practice is job related for the position
in question and consistent with business necessity.m
Before addressing the equal protection argument against federal
government employers (i.e., federal courts), it should be noted that an
employee of any state or municipality is shielded against denial of equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment by 42 U.S.C. § 1983Y'
Specifically, this law protects employees against employers who deprive
them "of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws ....

,202

Clearly, equal protection under the

Fourteenth Amendment is implicated in this broad coverage, but this
offers no remedy to an employee of the federal government, as this law
expressly applies only to "any State or Territory or the District of
Columbia."203
If a federal employee seeks to bring an equal protection claim
against the government, it must be framed in terms of the Fifth, not the
Fourteenth Amendment. Recognizing this, the Supreme Court stated that
"[ilt is also true that the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment [in
addition to the Fourteenth] contains an equal protection component
prohibiting the United States from invidiously discriminating between
individuals or groups. 2 °4 The clear benefit of a Title VII disparate
impact action over an equal protection claim is that the former has no
requirement that the plaintiff establish intent on the part of the
employer. 5 The Court, in addressing the distinction between a Title VII
action and an equal protection action added: "Our cases have not
embraced the proposition that a law or other official act, without regard
to whether it reflects a racially discriminatory , purpose, is
unconstitutional solely because it has a racially disproportionate
impact."2'

6

The authors' attempt to obtain empirical data as to the numbers of
minorities at the top of the class at the highest ranked law schools in the
200. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k)(1)(A)(i).

201. See42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1994).
202.
203.
204.
(1954)).
205.

Id.
Id.
Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (citing Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497
See Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432 ("Congress directed the thrust of the [Civil Rights] Act to the

consequences of employment practices, not simply the motivation.") (emphasis inoriginal).
206. Id. (emphasis in original).
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country (i.e., a potential "relevant labor pool") was fruitless. This may
be an essential factor to take into consideration in forming a disparate
impact charge under the present system of hiring Supreme Court law
clerks.20 However, as we submit and substantiate later, there are several
possible alternatives to this system. Additionally, with regard to the
present system, it is quite possible that "[t]he application process itself
might not adequately reflect the actual potential applicant pool, since
otherwise qualified people might be discouraged from applying because
of a self-recognized inability to meet the very standards challenged as
being discriminatory." 8 While it could prove difficult for federal law
clerks to identify the relevant labor pool in a disparate impact claim, this
alone should not serve as an impediment to commencing such an action.
Indeed, it is often difficult to determine the actual relevant labor pool in
a disparate impact claim. Unfortunately, however, this is not the only
problem that federal law clerks may face if they ultimately choose to file
suit.
C. The JudicialBranchEmployment Non-DiscriminationAct of 1999 &
The Problem With Using Title VII as the Vehicle to Right the Wrong
If Representative Jackson's bill were to become law, as written, an
inherent internal conflict in the Judiciary would result. This is because
his bill relies on the remedial processes of Title VII. If "conference,
conciliation, and persuasion" ' fail, the only available avenue for relief
would be the courts. The problem with this system, in the context of law
clerks seeking redress, is the potential for injustice, even if only in the
form of an appearance of impropriety. District court judges will find
themselves being asked to decide whether their peers have engaged in
discriminatory hiring practices. A more difficult and arduous task arises
when a presiding judge is asked to consider the legal propriety of the
hiring practices of those jurists who sit to oversee the propriety of his or
her work. The irony inherent in this approach necessitates an alternative
solution to this problem.

207. See Diehl v. Xerox Corp., 933 F. Supp. 1157, 1165 (W.D.N.Y. 1996) ("Under the
disparate impact theory, proof of a disparity is demonstrated through statistical analysis which
compares the impact of a particular employment action on a protected class as compared to the
impact upon qualified employees in the relevant labor pool.").
208. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977) (citing Teamsters, 431 U.S. at 365-67).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
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V. PROPOSED SOLUTIONS-THEIR POTENTIAL PROBLEMS

A. The NationalDean's List & Medical School Matching Systems
One reason why the current law clerk hiring system continues to
disappoint is because there is little consensus about how to fix it. Most
commentators agree that the system has major faults, but the
implementation of a "fair" system is an issue that remains unresolved.
Some would-be reformists continue to advocate a system whereby the
Justices would voluntarily change their hiring practices.2"' There is some
evidence to suggest that this is possible. In the last hiring term, two
African-American and three Asian clerks were hired by the Court. " '
Also, twelve women were among the thirty-four new clerks. 2 2 This
substantial increase in the percentage of minority hirings seems to be
indicative of progress.
However, the Court's hiring statistics only came to light recently,
so this may be just a maneuver intended to allay the critics, as opposed
to real progress. Justices are human and not immune to criticism. It is far
more likely that the recent wave of bad press was what inspired the
minority hiring "spree," rather than some sudden revelation on the part
of the Justices. Who can say, or guarantee, that they will not revert back
to former practices? Will the President of the NAACP have to get
arrested on the Court steps, every term, to ensure equal employment
opportunity? 213 It seems as though relying on voluntary, good faith
efforts of judges does not imbue accountability, and, therefore, should
not be considered a viable option.
Other reformists have proffered various matching systems to link
law students with particular judges. 4 One such system would allow the
deans of each of the nation's accredited law schools to nominate one
outstanding member of the graduating class for a Supreme Court
clerkship.2 5 Some believe that this "national dean's list" will broaden the
210. Initially, critics of the current system implored the Court to change its hiring practices by
"implementing recruiting procedures to ensure that diversity is emphasized .. " H.R. Res. 591, at

3.
211. See Mauro, High Courts,supra note 95, at 1A.
212. See id.
213. See Page, supranote 94, at 25.
214. However, some judges maintain that no matching systems, or any reform at all for that
matter, is necessary. See Kozinski, supranote 132, at 1707. Judge Kozinski feels "there is nothing
at all wrong with the current law clerk selection process; everything is hunky-dory. Efforts at socalled reform cannot, will not and should not succeed." Id.
215. See Page, supra note 94, at 25. "The justices would not be obliged to hire from the list,
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pool of applicants from which Justices choose their clerks.2 t 6
This system is not without its critics. 7 It has been noted that the
"national dean's list" could actually produce a less-diverse field of
applicants.1 8 Presumably, the deans would select their prize pupils,

providing no guarantees that this practice will promote diversity in any
form.1 9 Moreover, the system would probably take away too much
discretion from the Justices, who should have a wide array of students
from which to choose. For example, if there are only a few minorities on
the list, it could significantly inhibit a Justice's ability to conduct a broad
search for qualified minority candidates. Furthermore, judges and deans

might reasonably disagree over who is properly qualified for a Supreme
Court clerkship. After all, hiring criteria differs from employer to
employer. Who a law school dean believes to be a formidable candidate
may very well be viewed otherwise by a sitting Supreme Court Justice.
Also, the relationship between judge and clerk can be an intensely
personal one.2 0 It is important that judges maintain a large selection of
students from which to choose, lest the quality of our nation's
jurisprudence suffer.
Another system that is beginning to gain momentum is based on the
system used for matching medical students with doctors and hospitals.
Under this approach, students would be able to choose a list of judges
that they would like to work for, while judges are able to select a similar
list of students."' The ensuing "match" would determine where the
student would clerk.tm While this system sounds promising, it, like the
but at least they couldn't say they couldn't find qualified applicants." Id.
216. See id. Speaking in support of the national dean's list, Justice Brennan explained, "'Ithink
the minority problem would take care of itself if they would widen the pool."' Id.
217. See, e.g., Jeff Bleich & Kelly Klaus, White Marble Walls and Marble White Males, 46
FED. LAW. 24, 25, 28 (Sept. 1999). "[D]elegating 'kingmaker' (or 'queenmaker') authority to law
school deans might, if anything, produce a less-diverse applicant pool." Id. at 28.
218. See id. at28.
219. See id.
220. See, e.g., Patricia M. Wald, Selecting Law Clerks, 89 MICH. L. REV. 152, 153 (1990)
("The judge-clerk relationship is the most intense and mutually dependent one I know of outside of
marriage, parenthood, or a love affair.").
221. See id. at 160-61.
222. See id. at 161.
The system works like this: applicants apply to any program they are interested in;
interviews are conducted completely independently of the match. But no offers can be
made during the specified interview time. By a predetermined date, each applicant
submits a Rank Order List [of judges they would like to work for]. The judges, in turn,
submit similar lists of their 'true preferences.' ... Each judge would receive acceptances
from her highest ranked applicants who have not already received offers from judges that
the applicants prefer. A match between an applicant and a judge would constitute a
binding commitment.
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national dean's list, comes with no guarantees. For the system to work
properly, all judges would need to participate. If some judges were to opt
out of the medical model and carry on with the current system, the
remainder of those judges utilizing the medical model would be
disadvantaged since the "cream" of each graduating class would be
skimmed off first. The problem with these pragmatic approaches is that
it seems unlikely, at least at this point, that all judges would implement
an unfamiliar and possibly unpalatable system that is bound to limit their
applicant pool.
B. A Better Solution
Much of the focus surrounding potential solutions to the problem at
hand has been unduly centered around the pool of applicants, whereas,
the focus should be on the Justices themselves. The Justices maintain
that the top-tier law schools, and feeder judges, do not produce a
diversified field from which to choose. Yet, according to a 1999 study,
the two most commonly tapped schools for clerks, Harvard and Yale,
had minority-enrollment rates of twenty-four percent and thirty-one
percent, respectively.2 Still, white males are the overwhelming favorites
to land one of the much-coveted positions. From this, we glean that a
system of accountability must be imposed upon the Court, so that they
are no longer "above" or "set apart from" the laws of this nation.24
Accordingly, we propose the following corrective legislation.
While House Resolution 1048 is a valiant effort and noble cause, its
shortcomings seriously limit its effectiveness. Although we agree that
Title VII should apply to the Judiciary, the current remedies for a Title
VII violation are, as outlined above, contextually impractical. We
propose a variation of the traditional EEOC suit, so that if a clerk or
applicant wishes to bring a discrimination claim, he or she will have the
option of pursuing it either in the same branch, or a different branch of
government. In this sense, the system proffered here more closely
resembles the existing congressional system. This proposed solution
allows an aggrieved applicant or employee to pursue a discrimination
claim within or outside the legislative branch. Similarly, judicial branch
Id.
223. See Gatland, supra note 108, at 37. Further, the same study revealed that the minorityenrollment rates at Columbia, the University of Chicago, and Stanford are 34%, 20%, and 31%
respectively. See id. The female-enrollment rate at all five schools ranges between 42% and 45%.

See id.
224. See Equal Justice Under the Law, supra note 181.
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employees should still be able to pursue a claim within that branch.
Theoretically, this could mean that a district court judge could be
presiding over the case of a circuit court judge, or even a Supreme Court
Justice. The benefits of such a suit for the applicant/employee include,
inter alia, pecuniary damages. However, it cannot be ignored that this
route may present certain negative career ramifications for an incoming
applicant. Further, the applicant/employee may reasonably believe that
he or she would receive a more objective trial in another branch of
government, where a judge would not be asked to judge his or her peers,
or superiors, in a matter that would inevitably affect his or her own
hiring practices. The following is an alternative proposal that does not
involve bringing suit in district court.
If a clerk or applicant feels that he or she has been discriminated
against unlawfully, he or she could still initiate a proceeding by filing a
claim with the EEOC in Washington. It is unnecessary for a separate
office to be created within or outside of the EEOC, as it is best equipped
to deal with these kinds of claims. 2 ' EEOC attorneys are best suited, via
their training and experience, to separate the legitimate claims from the
frivilous ones. They are familiar with the intricate details of federal antidiscrimination laws, and have great investigatory tools at their disposal.
Indeed, the first part of our proposal necessitates the use of these
resources to "weed out" those claims that are frivolous and/or
unprovable. However, if the EEOC determines, after thorough
investigation, that a claim of discrimination against a federal Justice or
judge has merit, and attempts at mediation fail, the EEOC shall rectify
the situation by presenting its findings to a House Subcommittee on the
Judiciary in Congress.
In the House Subcommittee, which would be part of the greater
House Judiciary Committee, the EEOC would present its case against a
Justice/judge, much the same way it would present an employment

225. The authors recognize that many critics would find such a regulatory scheme to be
violative of the Separation of Powers Doctrine. Indeed, Senator Grassley encountered similar
obstacles while pushing the CAA through Congress. See, e.g., Grassley, supra note 39, at 46,
Senator Grassley wanted the Office of Compliance to adopt executive branch regulations, "but
Separation of Powers concerns ... made many of [his] colleagues reluctant, if not opposed, to living
under the [e]xecutive [b]ranch system." Id. Nonetheless, the CAA established that the regulations be
"as similar to the [e]xecutive [b]ranch regulations as possible." Id. Moreover, it is difficult to argue
that the judicial or legislative branches cannot occasionally be subjected to executive branch
regulation. If Congress can pass laws affecting judges' administrative functions, then the executive
branch should be empowered to enforce such legislation. Furthermore, it seems sensible to say that
"self-regulation, when not conducted by a disinterested and neutral third party, does not constitute
credible regulation at all." Id. at 36.
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discrimination claim in court. The Commission would call witnesses and
present evidence, and the Justice or judge would have the opportunity to
defend against the accusations by calling his or her own witnesses,
presenting evidence, and through cross-examination. After all the
evidence has been presented, the Subcommittee would have the option
of: (a) dismissing the claim outright; or (b) concluding that some form of
employment discrimination has taken place.
If the House Subcommittee concludes that a Title VII violation has
in fact occurred, the first step would be to put the Justice or judge on
notice by placing him on a form of "probation" for a specified period of
time. During the "probationary period," the Justice or judge would have
an opportunity to improve his or her hiring record. The EEOC would
issue specific goals and objectives for the Justice or judge to follow
during this time. After the probationary period ends, the Subcommittee
would reconvene and do one of three things:
1) Conclude that the Justice or judge has satisfactorily complied
with the terms of the probation, and warn such Justice or judge that he or
she can be put back on probation if he or she regresses into past hiring
practices; or
2) Conclude that the Justice or judge has made substantial, but
insufficient progress, and place such Justice or judge back on probation
for another specified period of time. This probationary period would be
shorter, however (with no Justice or judge placed on probation more
than twice); or
3) Conclude that the Justice or judge has directly disobeyed the
terms of the probationary period, and refer the matter to the full
Judiciary Committee to determine what sanctions should be imposed.
In most cases, the appropriate sanction would be either censure or
monetary fines. However, the Judiciary Committee should also be
permitted to refer the matter to the full House of Representatives to
consider impeachment as an appropriate sanction for repeated violations
committed by Justices or judges in determined acts of recalcitrance.
While this is a serious, and surely controversial remedy, we think it
important for the nation's highest judicial officers to live by the same
laws they interpret for the rest of us. Simply put, Justices must be
prepared to judge-and be judged-for there to be any measure of
accountability. The Constitution may grant judges and justices lifetime
posts, but it does not give them carte blanche to disregard the laws of
this country. They are only to maintain their posts during times of "good
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Behaviour ' '= 6 and employment-based discrimination is abhorrently poor,
and completely unacceptable behavior. We, as a nation, have an
appreciable interest in eliminating entrenched discrimination once and
for all, and what more fitting place to begin than our Judiciary.
Robert M. Agostisi* & Brian P. Corrigan~
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